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This paper proposes a new explanation for the paradoxes related to anthropic reasoning. 
Solutions to the Sleeping Beauty Problem and the Doomsday argument are discussed in detail. 
The main argument can be summarized as follows: 
1. Our thoughts, reasonings and narratives inherently comes from a certain perspective. With 
each perspective there is a center, or using the term broadly, a self. 
2. The natural first-person perspective is most primitive. However we can also think and 
express from others’ perspectives with a theory of mind. 
3. A perspective’s center could be unrelated to the topic of discussion so its de se thoughts need 
not to be considered, e.g. the perspective of an outside observer. Let’s call these the third-
person perspective.  
4. First-person reasoning allows primitive self identification as I am inherently unique as the 
center. Whereas from third-person perspective I am not fundamentally special comparing to 
others so a reference class of observers including me can be defined.  
5. It is my contention that reasonings from different perspectives should not mix. Otherwise it 
could lead to paradoxes even independent of anthropic reasoning.  
6. The paradoxes surrounding anthropic reasoning are caused by the aforementioned 
perspective mix. Regarding the sleeping beauty problem the correct answer should be double 
halving. Lewisian halving and thirding uses unique reasonings from both first and third-
person perspectives.  
7. Indexical probabilities such as “the probability that this is the first awakening” or “the 
probability of me being one of the first 100 billion human beings” also mixes first- and third-
person reasonings. Therefore invalid. 
8. Readers against perspectivism may disagree with point 1 and suggest we could reason in 
objective terms without the limit of perspectives. My argument is compatible with this belief. 
Objective reasoning would be analytically identical to the third-person perspective. My 
argument would become that objective reasoning and perspective reasonings should not mix. 
In the following I would continue to use “third-person perspective” but readers can switch 
that to “objective reasoning” if they wish so. 
 Comments are welcome at gaoxianda@gmail.com1
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"Everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to 
no one else” Gottlob Frege, (1918) 
1.Two Ways of Reasoning 
Consider this thought experiment: 
Imagine waking up alone in an empty room. The following message is displaying on the wall: 
An advanced alien race has made a trillion clones of a certain earthling. You are one of the 
clones. Their process is highly accurate so it’s humanly impossible to find any variation among 
the copies. They put each clone in an identical room as the one you are in right now. The 
question is, do you know which one is you?  
At first look it seems to be a rather strange question. It is extraordinarily trivial because I can 
inherently tell who I am. I can simply point to myself and say “this is me” and call it a day. So 
the answer must be yes I do know which is me. However there appears to be more to the 
problem. Because I am having a hard time trying to differentiating me from the other clones. 
They could also point to themselves and say “this is me” and also be correct. So in what way am 
I unique? This is beyond my knowledge because it is humanly impossible to find any variations 
among the copies. In this sense the answer can only be no because I could not definitively 
describe which clone is me. This contradiction highlights the difference between first- and third-
person reasoning.  
From first-person perspective the question is essentially asking if I’m able to identify myself. Let 
us put aside the philosophical debates about the nature of self for a moment. Here I’m only using 
self in the context of everyday language, as a specification of an individual. In this sense the 
answer is of course yes. From first-person perspective everything I know, all of my mind’s 
content, my feelings, thoughts, ideas and desires are ultimately based on experience or 
perception. As David Hume put it “I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and 
never can observe anything but the perception.” It is how I know the world. However things in 
the world does not have equal effect to the perception. Some part of the world is more directly 
related to it while some part more distant. When there is a paper cut on my finger it immediately 
registers pain. However a debilitating wound of a frontline soldier can only affect the perception 
though a series of event (such as a news report) which eventually lead to some sort of sensory 
input. The part of the world that is more immediate to the perception, things most intimate to the 
experience, can be regarded as the internal self. The rest of the world which is more remote can 
be seem as the external environment. This suggests the word self and environment are just 
relevant concepts with no clear cut difference. I think that is indeed the case. The convention of 
drawing the line at body’s physical boundary is nothing but an arbitrary decision motivated by 
conveniences, but I digress. Regardless of what is a reasonable boarder of self, in the world 
described by the thought experiment, there is obviously something most directly related to the 
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perception - someone specific. Following the question’s cue I can refer that specific clone as 
myself. Hence I point and say “This is me”. 
It seems reasonable to assume things exist in reality independent of my perception of them. So 
even though I cannot observe them, others have their own minds. Their thoughts, intentions, 
feelings and experiences are just as real as mine. If that’s the case then with a theory of mind it is 
perfectly valid to ask how could other minds identify me. Most interestingly what makes me 
unique in the eyes of someone impartial towards any of the clones. This is the question from 
third-person perspective . Here the immediacy to my perception is no longer useful since it is 2
imperceivable to others. Even if an outsider can observe all minds I am no more intimate to its 
perception than the rest of the clones. Therefore the differentiation must be based on something 
independent of one’s perspective: something objective. However because the cloning process is 
highly accurate I do not know any objective difference that would set me apart from the rest. So 
the information I have is not enough for an outsider to identify me. In this sense the answer is no, 
I do not know which one is me. Of course I can try to answer the question by performing actions 
and hoping objective differences arise among the clones.  For example I can hold up six fingers 3
and then identify me as “the clone who’s holding up six fingers”. But there is always the 
possibility that somebody else among the trillion clones is doing the same. So the identification 
is never definitive. If each room were assigned an unique number I can definitively identify me 
by it when that number is revealed to me. Nevertheless this is obviously very different from the 
first-person reasoning where I simply knows “this is me” without needing any information.  
The above example shows first- and third-person perspectives can potentially give opposite 
answers. It is crucial to acknowledge they are two completely different reasonings processes that 
are not interchangeable. The example also shows reasonings from different perspectives should 
be kept apart and not mixed. At least in this example that is quite intuitive. When asked “do you 
know which is you?” I imagine majority of people would want some clarification and ask what 
exact is it referring to. Can I just point and say “this is me”? Or do I need to provide an objective 
description? After all an answer of “yes AND no” is rather paradoxical. However in everyday life 
such distinction of perspectives are rarely needed. So we are apt to confound them and often 
arbitrarily switch perspectives in our logic. It shall be my contention that this perspective 
inconsistency is the root cause of many paradoxical arguments. These include the Doomsday 
Argument and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Before I get into the particulars of each case I want 
to further analyze the properties and differences between the perspectives.  
 Here on I am going to use third-person perspective to refer reasoning as if I am an outside observer, i.e. not as 2
someone who is perceptually close to any of the clones. This way all clones are in equal positions. Perhaps due to 
this impartiality this perspective is very often used in logic. It should also be pointed out that this observer does not 
have to be any specific being who actually exist. An completely imaginary observer is suffice for the purpose of 
third-person reasoning.
 Let’s ignore the debate of existence of freewill or if it possible for (near) identical clones in (near) identical 3
environments to make different decisions. They are unrelated to the argument. For the sake of the narrative let’s 
assume yes.
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In the thought experiment when I identify myself in first-person all I can say is “this is me”. It is 
a non-qualitative, non-descriptive reference. That is because qualities or features had no part in 
the reasoning. First-person self is subjective and primitive. Imagine yourself to be taller, shorter, 
being the opposite sex, born in a different time or some type of alien life-form all together. None 
of these changes would make it not you, as long as you are experiencing the world from its 
perspective making it the most immediate thing to the perception. This lack of quality and 
attributes suggest first-person self as the center of perception and consciousness is technically an 
immaterial concept. When we use the term self in everyday language to refer a person it is just an 
approximation of said concept. It also means the first-person identity is purely based on 
haecceity: the thisness of a thing. Compare that to the third-person identity which is based on 
quiddity, the whatness of a thing. Back in the thought experiment from third-person perspective I 
am defined by identifiable features, such as the room number. It is a qualitative and descriptive 
reference. Trying to mix first-person identity to a third-person identity would result in 
perspectively inconsistent problems. For example “Why am I(first-person) me(third person)?”, 
“Why am I not Bill Gates?”, or “How come I’m experiencing the world from this human’s 
perspective instead of some alien’s?”. Logic reasoning could not provide any answer to such 
questions.  
In the previous thought experiment, how similar the clones are is irrelevant in first-person 
reasoning. In fact I don’t even have to acknowledge other clones’ existence to say “this is me”. 
Because from my perspective I am inherently special. Everything beside myself, including the 
other clones, are just part of the external environment. It does not matter if the universe is infinite 
or there are multiverses with countless observers similar to me. It is clear to me that this is me 
and not any of those. Plainly put, from first-person perspective I am one of a kind, a peerless 
entity. From third-person perspective however, I am no longer in such privileged position. There 
is no inherent property that makes me stand out from others. Distinctive features have to be used 
to specify me from a reference class of observers. Therefore this reference class only exists in 
third-person perspective. For these reasons I shouldn’t regard my first-person self as a random 
sample from a reference class.  
Another point worth mentioning is that first-person perspective is the logic basis of self-interest. 
Pleasure or pain, gain or loss, I value them most if they are of my own. Because that way they 
are most imminent to the perception with greatest effect on the experience. This primitive self-
interest cannot be justified from third-person perspective as it is neutral towards all entities in the 
reference class. There is no reason to put one clone’s interest over another just because their 
room numbers are different. This highlights the importance of first-person reasoning since the 
concept of rational agents, which is widely used in decision theory and economics, is based on 
this primitive self-interest.  
However first-person reasoning is not without its limitations. One of its shortcoming is regarding 
the counterfactual scenario of me not existing. It is impossible to discuss such ideas from the 
first-person perspective because it is ontologically self-contradictory to reason from a 
perspective while also declaring that perspective's center do not exist. Clearly none can be 
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identified by immediacy to perception if there is no perception to begin with. If this is not 
obvious enough we can look at its contraposition. To see my own nonexistence cannot coexist 
with first-person reasoning I only need to realize that first-person reasoning will always affirm 
self existence. This was done by Rene Descartes with the famous cogito ergo sum, usually 
translated as “I think therefore I am”. This idea is also captured by the intuitive notion that "I 
would always find myself exist". From first-person perspective there simply is no counterfactual 
for my existence. My nonexistence can only be meaningfully reasoned from a third-person 
perspective where I am specified by features instead of immediacy to perception. Consequently 
any discussion about the probability of my current existence must also be done from a third-
person perspective. 
Another perhaps more important limit of the first-person identify its incommunicability.  When I 4
identify myself from first-person perspective the only criteria was the immediacy to perception. 
But because my perception is imperceivable to others this subjective identity is only meaningful 
to me. To effectively communicate I have to use third-person perspective and describe me by 
objective features. Perhaps the most common practice is the use of names. From first-person 
perspective assigning myself a name is redundant. I would never confuse myself with anybody 
else. However names make communication immensely easier by acting as an observable feature 
by all. Trying to directly communicate first-person self is futile. In everyday life when I say “this 
is me” to someone it may seem to be meaningful only because the listener uses contextual 
information to define me in third-person. The listener may be defining me as the guy who’s 
talking, the one with a specific look or all observable traits combined. Getting rid of these 
contextual information and the sentence would be incomprehensible. In the thought experiment 
if you are trying to leave a message for an outsider to pinpoint you among all the clones then the 
least helpful thing would be writing down “this is me”.  
This incommunicability of first-person self identification has an interesting implication. It 
suggests in some rare cases two rational people sharing all their information could rightfully 
disagree with each other. Even if they are free to communicate. Each of them would think the 
other person’s reasoning is correct although his result is different i.e. they would agree to 
disagree. Some readers might notice this seems to contradict Aumann’s Agreement Theorem. I 
would argue this is justified. For this disagreement to occur one person’s observable features 
shouldn’t related to the matter at question other than he belongs to a certain reference class. So 
from third-person perspective he is just an unspecific individual from said reference class. While 
from first-person perspective he would naturally see himself as a distinct entity. Because this 
specification is based on the primitive first-person identification it is incommunicable. Thus they 
would have different interpretations for the same situation, leading to a disagreement. Such cases 
rarely occurs in everyday life. However in thought experiments involving the duplication of 
mental states it can happen. I will explain in more detail with examples in section 4.  
 Another way to put it is “the de se cannot be reduced to the de dicto. There is something special about learning 4
who oneself is that cannot be captured in learning about what features one process” (Liao, 2012)
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2. Doomsday Argument 
The Doomsday Argument (Carter and McCrea, 1983) is a probabilistic argument predicting the 
number of future humans yet to be born based on one’s own birth rank. The argument can be 
summarized as follows. Let N be the total number of humans who were or will be born. Let n be 
my own birth rank among all humans. Without any other information I shall assume I am equally 
likely to be at any position from 1 to N. After learning my own birth ranking, say n is 100 billion, 
I can construct a posterior distribution of N, which suggests the total number of humans would 
more likely to be smaller than bigger. E.g. probability of N being 200 billion is greater than the 
probability of N being 200 trillion. Ceteris paribus, this suggest we should have a more 
pessimistic outlook about our future as a specie, i.e. the doom is closer than we normally think.  
The argument pivots on the Self Sampling Assumption (SSA). The term is coined by Nick 
Bostrom (2002) which suggests all other things equal, I should reason as if I am randomly 
selected from the set of all actually existent observers (past, present and future) in my reference 
class. An alternative principle which rebuttals the doomsday argument is the Self Indication 
Assumption (SIA). It states that all other things equal, I should reason as if I am randomly 
selected from the set of all possible observers in my reference class.  To illustrate the difference 5
between the two the following thought experiment is often used.  
Imagine there are a thousand rooms numbered from 1 to 1000. A fair coin is tossed by the 
advanced alien. If it lands on heads a clone of an earthing would be created in each room from 1 
to 1000. If it lands on tails a clone would be created in each room from 1 to 10 only. Suppose 
you wake up in one of the rooms and the experiment procedure was displaying on the wall in 
front of you. How should you guess which way the coin fell? Now suppose the room number is 
revealed to you. It turns out to be 7. How should you guess the coin now?  6
According to Self Sampling Assumption when I wake up in the room I have no relevant 
information about the coin toss. So I ought to guess the fair coin landed with an even chance. 
Here I can calculate the conditional probability of my room number by treating myself as a 
randomly selected individual among all existing clones. For example, conditional on heads the 
probability that my room number being between 1 and 10 is 1% since only 10 out of the 1000 
clones are in those range. While conditional on tails the probability that my room number being 
between 1 and 10 is 100% since all clones are in the first 10 rooms. After knowing my room 
number is 7 I have to adjust my answer about the coin. The probability of tails is now much 
higher since it is more likely to give the observed room number. With Baye’s theorem it can be 
calculated to be around 99%. It is easy to see why such reasoning would lead to the doomsday 
argument when transferred to the future of human population. Under Self Sampling Assumption 
 Nick Bostrom used the term in a slightly different way according to which this school of thought should be called 5
SSA+SIA. However majority of the literature simply refer it as SIA. The argument is first proposed by Dieks (1992) 
and also used by Olum (2002) as a counter to the Doomsday argument. 
 This example is used by Nick Bostrom (2002) with slight modifications. 6
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a hypothesis with less people existing would more likely lead to my observed birth rank. Just like 
being tails, doom would more likely to be happening sooner rather than later.  
The above answers changes drastically if Self Indication Assumption is used instead. According 
to which when I wake up in my room I do have relevant information about the coin toss. The 
information that I exist. Treating myself as randomly selected from the 1000 possible clones that 
might be created, I actually exist is an evidence favouring heads. Because if the coin landed 
heads all 1000 potential clones would be created. My conditional probability of existence would 
be 1. But if the coin landed tails only 10 out of the 1000 potential clones would be created. 
Meaning the probability of my existence would be only 1%. Using Baye’s theorem the 
probability of heads can be calculated to be about 99%. After learning my room number is 7 this 
probability is reduced. Because I, the (possible) clone from room 7, is guaranteed to be created 
regardless of the coin toss result. So the the probability of heads is back at 50%. Transferring this 
logic to the real world, the doomsday argument based on my birth rank is exactly cancelled out 
by the fact that I exist. Perhaps due to this elegancy it is the leading counter to the doomsday 
argument. However the Self Indication Assumption has controversies of its own. It suggests I 
should strongly favour hypotheses with great number of observers simply because I exist. This 
could lead to absurd arguments such as the case of the Presumptuous Philosopher  (Bostrom, 7
2002). It also suggests simply because I exist the Great Filter is more likely to be ahead of us 
rather than behind. Meaning human’s outlook as a specie should still be more pessimistic but due 
to a different reason from the Doomsday Argument (Grace, 2010). 
Neither Self Sampling Assumption nor Self Indication Assumption stated how was “I” specified. 
It was treated as if it is obvious enough to be left undefined. But as explained in the first section, 
first-person self, i.e. primitive identification based on subjective proximity to perception, and 
third-person identity, i.e. identity based on distinct features among a reference class of observers, 
are very different concepts. Each identity must only be used in their own perspective without 
interchanging. Both Self Sampling Assumption and Self Indication Assumption confound the 
two by arbitrarily switching perspectives in their argument. This mix of different perspectives is 
why both of them are mistaken. 
Just as the first thought experiment, here I can easily specify me in first-person by immediacy to 
perception. However I cannot specify me in third-person by objective differences relevant to the 
coin toss. At the time of awakening, from first person perspective I know specifically I, myself, 
exist. This is not surprising since self existence is a guaranteed observation from first-person 
perspective. On the other hand from third-person perspective since I cannot specify me the only 
information available is that an unspecified clone exists, i.e. there exist at least one clone. Again 
this is not surprising because no matter how the coin lands more than one clone would have been 
created. There is no new information no matter which perspective we choose to reason from. The 
 In this thought experiment the universe either has a trillion observers or a trillion trillion trillion observers. All 7
observations are indifferent towards both theories. Physicists are about to run a simple experiment to determined 
which theory is correct. But a philosopher claim such experiment is unnecessary and according to SIA the bigger 
universe must be correct with a probability of a trillion trillion to one.
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odds ought to stay even. When the room number is revealed to be 7, in third-person this simply 
means a clone was created in room 7. That was certain to happen regardless of heads or tails. 
From first-person perspective I just learnt the room most immediate to perception is numbered 7, 
which means my existence does not depend on the coin toss result. So knowing that gives me no 
evidence about the coin toss. Again from both perspectives there is no new information and the 
probability stays at 50%. In short, whichever perspective we choose to reason from, as long as its 
consistent, the odd of coin toss stays at half. Transferring this logic to the real world means 
neither the fact that I exist nor my birth rank would have any effect on the outlook of human’s 
future.  
It may seem natural to ask “what is the probability that I am a clone from room 1 to 10”. This 
question is actually ill-defined. In the question “I” am only specified in first-person by subjective 
proximity to perception. While “a clone from room 1 to 10” is a third-person identity based on 
objective difference among a reference class. Therefore the question cannot be fully interpreted 
from either perspectives and one must switch perspectives in order to comprehend it. So this 
seemingly innocuous question itself is perceptively inconsistent. The probability of me being a 
clone from room 1 to 10 is actually invalid therefore do not exist.  8
Some may argue that I can identify myself in third-person by objective details observed after 
waking up. This third-person identity could then be used to specify me among all possible 
clones. This would result in a probability shift. For example, imagine in each room there is a 
deck of cards. After waking up I can shuffle it to get a random sequence. It can be stated that a 
clone with this sequence exists. If more clones were created then this statement would more 
likely to be true since that specific sequence would more likely to be produced by one of the 
clones. So this should be considered an evidence favouring the scenario with more clones.  By 9
this logic the probability of heads should be much higher as suggested by Self-Indication 
Assumption. However this argument is flawed. That particular sequence was used in that 
statement only because I shuffled it after waking up. Of course a clone with such an ad hoc 
sequence exists. Since it is a guaranteed observation no probability update is warranted. 
Compare this to a different process. Here a particular sequence is first specified before checking 
any clone’s deck. If the same sequences was recreated among all the clones then it is an evidence 
favouring heads. In this process the recreation of the specified sequence is not guaranteed. More 
clones leads to a higher chance of success. Therefore a bayesian update should be rightly carried 
out. The previous argument however made no such pre-commitment to any sequence. It 
essentially substitute the experiment process without pre-selection with a different process with 
pre-selection and performed calculation base on that different process. Of course its calculation 
 Since none of the major school of thoughts in anthropic reasonings endorse this idea. I expect there are going to be 8
many objections regarding this invalidity. In Section 5 I will discuss in more detail of why this invalidity is not as 
obscure as it may seem. 
 This example is only focusing on the deck of card for the ease of expression. All details observed after waking up 9
can be used. The argument of using all details observed in probability calculation is called Full Non-indexical 
Conditioning. (Neal, 2006)
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is wrong.  Consequently any details I observed after waking up, unless otherwise related to the 10
coin toss, should not change the probability due to the lack of pre-commitment.  11
Self-Sampling Assumption and Self-Indication Assumption both merge the two perspectives 
together. Doing so means defining the first-person self by features to enable the switch to third-
person perspective. However as discussed earlier first-person self is only defined by subjective 
proximity to the perception. That’s where their mistake lays. It does not matter which exact 
imaginary selection process was used. As a result they both have a subtle self-contradiction. At 
one hand all clones are considered equals. On the other hand one of the clones, myself, is 
inherently special such that no information is needed to specify it. The first part of Self-Sampling 
Assumption’s argument, which states that I have no new information by simply finding myself 
exist, can be fully contained in first-person reasoning. So that part is perspectively consistent. 
Therefore it answers correctly that the probability of heads is 1/2. However by calculating the 
conditional probability of my room number the perspective is switched and first-person self is 
redefined as a result of a random selection among all existing clones. Consequently it incorrectly 
increases the probability to 99%. For Self-Indication Assumption the perspective switch 
happened right from the start. It specifies me in third-person by redefining my first-person 
identity as a result of a random selection among all possible clones. Using that specification a 
Bayesian update is performed. Therefore its answer of the probability being 99% is wrong. The 
reason that it gives the correct answer of 1/2 after knowing the room number is because it 
performed another perspectively inconsistent calculation which happens to cancel out the first 
mistake. Due to these reasons neither the Doomsday Argument nor the Presumptuous 
Philosopher is correct.  
3. Sleeping Beauty Problem 
Another perhaps more famous paradox caused by perspective inconsistency is the sleeping 
beauty problem (Elga, 2000). It describes an experiment where you are going to be briefly woke 
up either once or twice depending the result of a random coin toss. If the coin landed on heads 
you would be woken up only once on day 1. If tails you would be woken up twice, on day 1 as 
well as on day 2. At the end of each day your memory of the awakening would be erased. Now 
supposed you are awakened in the experiment, how confident should you be that the coin landed 
on heads? How should you change your mind after learning this is the first awakening? 
This problem gained a lot of attention over the last decade. Though vigorously debated by many 
highly capable individuals no agreement has been reached regarding the correct answer. There 
are three main positions (Titelbaum, 2013). Thirders think the probability of heads is 1/3 at wake 
up and then 1/2 after learning it is the first awakening(e.g. Elga, 2000; Dorr,2002). Lewisian 
halfers think the probability of heads is 1/2 at the time of awakening and then 2/3 after learning 
 Arguments confounding the selection process leads to paradoxical conclusions in problems independent of 10
anthropic reasoning, e.g. Boy or Girl paradox.
 Another systematic counter for this argument is available in section 3.11
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this is the first awakening (e.g. Lewis. D, 2001). Double halfers think the probability of heads is 
1/2 at the time of awakening and stays at 1/2 after learning it is the first awakening(e.g. Halpern, 
2004; Bostrom, 2007; Meacham,2008). Currently the thirder view is the dominating position 
(Winkler, 2017). I believe double halving is the correct answer. However to my knowledge my 
reasoning is different from all previous published arguments for this position. 
Lewisian halfer’s reason can be summarized as follows. After waking up I have no new 
information about the coin toss. Therefore the probability ought to stay at 1/2. By treating this 
awakening as randomly selected from all actual awakenings I can calculate the conditional 
probability of this being the first. If the coin landed heads then this must be the first and only 
awakening. Whereas if the coin landed tails the probability of this being the first awakening is 
only half. Therefore knowing this is in fact the first awakening is an evidence favouring heads. A 
bayesian update can be carried out. As a result the probability of heads shall increase to 2/3. It is 
essentially the Self-Sampling Assumption applied to this problem.  12
Thirder’s reasoning agrees with the Self-Indication Assumption instead . By its logic after 13
waking up I do have new information . The fact that I am awake today. According to Self-14
Indication Assumption today can be thought as a randomly selected day from day 1 or day 2. So 
if the coin landed tails then the probability of me being awake today would be 1. Whereas if the 
coin landed heads, the probability of me being awake today would be 1/2. The fact that I am 
awake today is evidence favouring tails. The probability for heads should decrease to 1/3. After 
learning that today is day 1, i.e. the day that I would be awake regardless of the coin toss result, 
the probability of heads would increase back to 1/2. 
Similarities between the sleeping beauty problem and the alien’s coin toss from previous section 
is obvious. The only notable difference is how the duplicated instances are actually created. In 
the previous problem it is achieved by cloning. Here it is done by memory wipe. This should not 
result in any change in the way we solve the problem.  The memory wipe can be regarded as an 15
information barrier. It prevents any information to pass though to the following day. As a result 
my experience and perception would not be in anyway affected by what happens on the other 
day. Therefore from first-person perspective the person from the other awakening is simply not 
 David Lewis did not specifically say an observer should treat himself as randomly selected among all actually 12
existing observers. However his argument does agree with Self-Sampling Assumption’s result. (Lewis, 2001)
 This is actually an oversimplification consider all the different arguments supporting thirding. But by and large 13
thirders accepts the consequences of Self-Indication Assumption in general. 
 Some thirder (e.g. Monton, 2002) including Elga (2000) do not think there is new information upon awakening. 14
However many thirders with this position now argues finding oneself awake in the experiment is new information 
indeed (e.g. Weintraub, 2004; Horgan, 2004; Winkler, 2017)
 Many authors from different camps have used examples with physical duplication in their discussion. It is 15
generally accepted that the method of duplication does not affect the underlying problem. However given then 
amount of literature on this problem there are disagreements about this equivalency as expected. Readers interested 
in such arguments can check out Kierland and Monton (2005). 
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me . As a result the exact same first-person reasoning from the previous question can be applied 16
here. Of course from third-person perspective I am usually regarded as the same individual in the 
two awakenings. However from third-person perspective the identity was never relevant to the 
question anyway. What is important is the indexical position of the awakening, i.e. whether it is 
day 1 or day 2. Due to the experiment setup no information relevant to the coin toss is available 
to specify today from the third-person perspective. Just as in the alien’s coin toss problem the 
third-person identity could not be specified due to high accuracy cloning. Therefore the same 
third-person reasoning can be used as well. As a result the following solution would be very 
similar in format compare to the previous section.  
One thing halfers and thirders have in common is that neither mentioned how is today or this 
awakening specified. The concept of now or this moment are meaningful due to their immediacy 
to perception i.e. their thisness (haecceity) . Therefore today or this awakening are only specified 
from first-person perspective. However due to the experiment setup no objective difference 
relevant to the coin toss is available to distinguish a day. So they cannot be specified in third-
person.  As a result at the time of waking up I can reason in two ways. From first-person 17
perspective I know I am awake today. Finding myself exist or conscious is a guaranteed 
observation from first-person perspective. Therefore it offers no new evidence. From third-
person perspective the only information available is that beauty is awake on an unspecific day, or 
there is at least one awakening. This is not new information because regardless of the coin toss 
result there is at least one guaranteed awakening. The probability of the coin toss ought to stay 
even. After learning that this is the first awakening it can still be reasoned in two ways. From 
third-person perspective it is already known that there would be an awakening on day 1. So no 
new information is gained about the coin toss. From first-person perspective I learnt that my 
awakening does not depend on the coin toss.  However this doesn’t tell me anything about how 18
the coin fell. So the probability should still remains at 1/2. No matter which perspective was 
chosen, as long as it is consistent, the answer would be 1/2 at awakening and remains at 1/2 after 
learning today is day 1.  
 Since first-person self is defined by subjective immediacy to perception it inherently identifies self at the present 16
moment. This means the center of first-person perspective is a primitively identified person-stage instead of a 
persistent person. The notion of subjective persistent person has to be a logical posterior of this person-stage. Liao 
(2012) proposed the same idea while discussing centered worlds. Therefore another way to put it would be my 
subjective persistent self does not include the other awakening. 
 It may seem words such as today or now are communicable so it should also be meaningful from third-person 17
perspective. However this sense of communicability is misguided. It seems to be understandable if the message 
sender and receiver are temporally close or the time delay of communication is known such that each person’s own 
sense of now can be used to approximate the another’s, i.e. one’s de se thought matters for the comprehension of the 
moment. Imagine finding a message in a bottle on the beach. If it says “a storm is brewing now…”. It would give 
you no indication of what time it is referring to. Even though it is obvious the message sender clearly wrote now and 
knew exactly when he meant by it. This shows concepts such as now or this moment are incommunicable just as 
first-person self identity.
 Remember from first-person perspective I only regard whoever awake today as myself. Beauty awake on the other 18
day, if there is another awakening, is primitively not me. 
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Same as before, the questions of “what is the probability that today is day 1?” or “what is the 
probability that this is the first awakening?” are invalid questions which have no answer. It is 
because these questions cannot be fully interpreted from either perspectives. From first-person 
perspective “today” or “this awakening” can be specified base on its immediacy to perception. 
However from first-person perspective this is my one and only awakening. On the other hand the 
sequence of the awakenings, and day 1 or 2, is meaningful from a third-person perspective. 
However from third-person perspective “today” or “this awakening” cannot be meaningfully 
specified. So these seemingly innocuous questions are actually incomprehensible either way thus 
perspectively inconsistent. Consequently they have no valid answer.   19
As expected there are also arguments that tries to specify this awakening or today in third-person 
by details observed after waking up. In my opinion the best formulated one is the Technicolor 
Beauty (Titelbaum, 2008) where an insignificant detail was added to the original problem . The 20
experimenter would randomly choose one of the two days and put a piece of red paper on the 
wall, on the other day he would put out a piece of blue paper. The argument can be summarized 
as follows. When I wake up I would see a piece of paper. Say that paper is blue. Then it can be 
stated that beauty is awake on the blue day. Which is new information since I could not know 
that just from the experiment setup. Because the probability of beauty being awake on the blue 
day is one conditional on tails comparing to half conditional on heads this is an evidence 
favouring tails. As a result the probability of heads could be calculated by bayesian updating to 
be 1/3. If I see the red paper the same argument can still be applied due to symmetry. Therefore 
even before I open my eyes and see the colour of the paper I should already conclude that the 
probability of heads must be 1/3. Instead of repeating my previous argument here I am going to 
use a counter example. Imagine you are on an exotic island where all families have two children. 
The island is having their traditional festival of boys’ day. On this day it is their custom for each 
family with a boy to raise a flag next to their door. Tradition also dictates in case someone 
knocks on the door then only a boy can answer. You notice about 3/4 of the families has raised a 
flag as expected. It should be obvious that if you randomly choose a family with a flag then the 
probability of that family having two boys is 1/3. You also know if you knock on the door a boy 
would come to answer it so by seeing him there is no new information. But not so fast. When 
you see the boy you can ask him “are you the older or the younger child?”. Say he is the older 
one. Then it can be stated that the older child of the family is a boy. This is new information 
since I could not know that just by seeing the flag. If both children are boys then the conditional 
probability of the older child being a boy is one. If only one child is a boy then the conditional 
probability of the older child being a boy is only half. Therefore this new evidence favours the 
former. As a result the probability of this family having 2 boys can be calculated by bayesian 
updating to be 1/2. If the child is the younger kid the same reasoning can still be applied due to 
symmetry. Therefore even before asking I should already conclude the randomly chosen family’s 
 Once again I expect many objections about this invalidity since both halfers and thirders readily calculate these 19
probabilities. More discussion of this is presented in Section 5. 
 Similar arguments have also been proposed by Rosenthal’s (2008) Sleeping Peon Problem. As mentioned before 20
these arguments are closely related to Full Non-Indexical Conditioning (Neal, 2006)
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probability of having 2 boys is 1/2 instead of 1/3. This is absurd. Given their resemblance it is 
quite clear technicolor beauty’s argument is not valid.  
Imagine before knocking on the family’s door you make a pre-commitment among one of the 
two children. Say you randomly decide to see the older child specifically. If the older child 
comes out and it turns out to be a boy then it would be correct to increase the probability of two 
boys from 1/3 to 1/2. In this process it is entirely possible that you would see a girl. Therefore 
seeing a boy is indeed evidence favouring the family having more boys. But that’s not the 
process of the exotic island problem where no such pre-commitment is made. In its process you 
would always meet a boy at the door. When asked if he is the older or younger child ,whatever 
the boy’s answer is, obviously it is guaranteed to be a boy. You are looking right at him. For this 
process the probability of two boys must remain at 1/3. The mistake happened because the 
argument used a different process in its calculation even though that process also lead to the 
observation of “the older child is a boy”.  With this in mind the mistake of technicolor beauty’s 21
argument is apparent. In the experiment there is no pre-commitment made to any color. That’s 
why no matter which color beauty sees the same argument can be applied due to symmetry. 
However its calculation is based on a process with pre-commitment. For example the 
experimenter could randomly decide to check the room on the blue day specifically. If he saw 
beauty awake on that day then the probability of tails should be increased to 2/3. Obviously that 
is a completely different process from beauty simply opening her eyes and check the paper. Even 
though both process can lead to the observation of “beauty is awake on the blue day”.  As a 22
result technicolor beauty’s calculation is invalid the same way as the exotic island problem does. 
Some may argue checking the color on today specifically is a pre-commitment among the two 
days thus its calculation is valid. There are two problems for this argument. First it completely 
negates any relevance of the color or any other details observed after waking up. Same 
calculation can be carried out base on the simple fact that beauty is awake today. Secondly the 
argument essentially becomes Self-Indication Assumption itself. Since it is well established that 
Self-Indication Assumption would lead to thirding it means this technicolor example makes no 
contribution to thirders’ case.  
Many authors have used arguments involving operationalization to present their case. It often 
involves repeating the experiment and counting the relative frequency in certain way (e.g. 
Groisman, 2008) . Sometimes it involves a monetary reward (e.g. Arntzenius, 2002). Others use 
elaborate Dutch Book arguments by setting up various kind of bets to show what the correct 
probability should be (e.g. Hitchcock, 2004; Draper & Pust, 2007). These argument are 
ineffective at convincing the opposition because people with different opinions would simply 
 The possible outcomes of the process with pre-commitment are : the older child is a boy vs the older child is a 21
girl. The possible outcomes of the exotic island problem without pre-commitment are: the older child is a boy vs the 
younger child is a boy. Therefore they convey different information even with the same observation.
 Like the previous example. The possible outcomes of the process with pre-commitment are: beauty is awake on 22
the blue day vs beauty is asleep on the blue day. Whereas the possible outcomes of beauty simply opening her eyes 
without pre-commitment are : beauty is awake on the blue day vs beauty is awake on the red day. Therefore they 
convey different information even with the same observation.
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disagree on the bookkeeping rule and/or beauty’s objective. Nonetheless it is still interesting to 
see what should the operationalization looks like when perspective reasoning is considered. 
Remember due to the memory wipe whatever happens on the other day has no effect on the 
perception so from first-person perspective it is not myself. Hence from beauty’s first-person 
perspective any repetition of the experiment has to happen without passing though a memory 
wipe. Since a memory wipe would happen at the end of the day the next repetition will need to 
fit within the time constrain. So the next experiment must be shorter, e.g. the first awakening in 
the morning and the second possible awakening in the afternoon. Further repetitions would be 
even shorter still to fit in the time slot the previous experiment has left. From an outside 
observer’s third-person perspective every awakening should be treated the same. As a result the 
repetitions would not be chronologically sequential but nested with multiple levels instead, i.e. 
using memory wipes, the first level separate the duration of the experiment into two halves, the 
next level separate each resulting segment into two halves again, so on and so forth. It would be 
in a form similar to a supertask. Even if the experiment is repeated infinite number of times it 
would still have to happen within two days.  This may seems a little tedious. It is because in this 23
problem the duplicated instances are created by a memory wipe at a predetermined time. If I am 
physically duplicated, e.g. by memory retained cloning, then the process would be much clearer. 
After going through a random cloning procedure, a repetition from my first-person perspective 
obviously means going through the random cloning procedure again. It would in no way involve 
killing me off which is the equivalent of letting the memory wipe happen in sleeping beauty’s 
case. Other clones, even though complete irrelevant from my perspective, should go through the 
same procedure. Therefore from the perspective of an outside observer repetitions means the 
clones would keep on multiplying with compound duplication  just as the nested mode in 24
sleeping beauty problem does. From first-person perspective a subject should only be interested 
in coin tosses that directly involves her subjective persistent self. After all if I see myself as 
inherently special then coin tosses involving me must also be uniquely different from others so 
there is no point considering other’s coin tosses. If the experiment is repeated near infinite 
number of times then beauty would personally count the coin lands heads about half of the time, 
meaning the frequentist and bayesian approach gives the same answer. Obviously from an 
observer’s third-persons perspective all the coin tosses for all the clones need to be considered. 
This is uncomplicated since outside observers are never involved in memory wipes or cloning. 
Clearly about half of all these tosses are landing on heads. Meaning frequentist and bayesian 
probability gives the same answer from third-person perspective as well.  
As mention above, another controversy closely related to the frequentist argument is the use of 
bets. After each awakening beauty can be offered a bet which she can decide the fair price to 
 Two days from the outside observer’s third-person perspective to be precise. 23
 Borrowing from the concept of compound interest. It simply means resulting duplicates from previous 24
experiments would experience further duplications in the future repetitions. 
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enter.  That fair price should in theory reflect the correct probability. However in sleeping 25
beauty’s case it turns out to be more complicated than that. With different motives beauty’s 
decision actually reflects different probabilities. For example, if beauty is trying to maximize the 
total money belonging to all copies she should make her decision as if the probability of heads is 
1/3. Whereas if she is trying to maximize the average money of each copy then she should make 
her decision as if the probability is 1/2. Even if beauty is simply selfishly trying to maximize her 
own personal gain the decision is still ambivalent depending on beauty’s position on issues such 
as counterfactual identity and self non-existence (Armstrong, 2011). With these in mind it would 
be interesting to see how perspective reasoning links beauty’s decision to probability. First of all 
for beauty’s decision to properly reflect probability the bets’ cost and rewards shall follow her 
first-person perspective. This means when duplication occurs the subject’s money/debt shall 
duplicate with her. If the duplication is achieved by memory wipe as in sleeping beauty’s case 
then whenever a period’s memory is lost the accrued gain or loss of that corresponding period 
shall be expunged as well. This would ensure indistinguishable copies are in identical financial 
states. Furthermore this also makes beauty’s cumulative gain or loss to be in agreement with her 
first-person experience if the experiment is repeated. Secondly for her decision to reflect 
probability the proper motive for beauty should be simple self-interest. While various forms of 
altruism towards copies are also valid objectives they are justified by intricate intentions such as 
ethics or evolutionary psychology. These considerations adds an another layer of complexity 
which could cause beauty’s decision to deviate from probabilities. Whereas self-interest is 
primitive so the link between probabilities and decision is direct. It might be helpful to think as if 
each duplicate has her own account which is settled independently. With the above two points 
beauty’s rational decision can be readily derived.  The fair price for beauty to enter a bet that 26
pays 1 dollar in case of heads shall be 50 cents. This can be easily verified using the previously 
mentioned nested repetition model. Some may detest the idea of duplicating money and suggest 
gain or loss from the bets should remain unchanged. Others might think all clones from the 
experiment ought to be treated equally when making decisions. These ideas seems reasonable 
because they are justified, but only from a third-person perspective. To be consistent with the 
third-person perspective such ideas shall be in effect if the decision maker, i.e. the person 
entering the bets, is an outside observer. Obviously for such a decision maker it makes no sense 
to duplicate his money nor give preferential treatment to any specific clone. It is also trivial for 
the observer, i.e. someone who does not experience memory wipe or duplication, that the fair 
price for a bet on coin toss should be half the payout. This shows once again the probability of 
heads should be half from both first- and third-person perspectives.  
 Halfers may disagree and argue only one bet should be offered per coin toss, e.g. a bet is offered on Monday only 25
whereas the bet on Tuesday is just a placeholder or dummy with no actual cash exchange. However this is argument 
is not convincing. Firstly it treats two otherwise similar awakenings differently without a clear reason. Secondly it 
does not translate very well to cases with physical duplication. For example the duplication process could be the 
original person is split into two halves and each half can be connected with a artificially constructed counterpart to 
form a new body. In this process the resulting copies are symmetrical and it is not clear which one should be offered 
the dummy.
 Complex issues such as self-nonexistence and counterfactual identity are no longer relevant if perspective 26
reasoning is used. E.g. from first-person perspective self nonexistence is an irrelevant concept. People in 
counterfactual worlds are isolated from perception so from first-person perspective none would be regarded as self. 
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4. Perspective Disagreements 
As mentioned earlier perspective reasoning suggests in some cases two people in direct 
communication should disagree with each other. It has been discovered that any halfer position 
would lead to such a disagreement (Pittard, 2015). This deserves our attention because it seems 
counterintuitive. It shall be pointed out that Self-Indication Assumption, or thirder’s reasoning in 
regards to the Sleeping Beauty Problem, would not result in such disagreements. This has been 
used as an evidence favouring Self-Indication Assumption(Grace, 2011). However here I would 
argue disagreements of this kind are valid. They should indeed have different probabilities to the 
same proposition.  
Let’s consider the following experiment. An alien has abducted you and one of your friends. You 
are put to sleep. The alien then tosses a fair coin. If it lands on heads it won’t do anything to you. 
If it lands on tails it will clone you and put the clone into another identical room. The clone 
process is highly accurate so that the memory is retained. As a result the clone, as well as the 
original, can not tell if he is old or new. Meanwhile your friend never goes though any cloning 
process. After waking you up the alien let your friend choose one of the two rooms to enter. 
Suppose your friend has chosen your room. As a result you guys meet each other inside. How 
should you reason about the probability of the coin toss? How should your friend reason it? 
For my friend the question is non-anthropic thus very simple. If the coin landed heads then 1 out 
of the 2 rooms would be empty. If the coin landed tails then both rooms would be occupied. 
Because the room that she randomly chose is occupied she now has new evidence favouring 
tails. As a result the probability of heads can be calculate by a simply bayesian update to be 1/3.  
For me the question is not too complicated either.  After waking up I have no new evidence 27
about the fair coin toss. So I ought to believe the probability of heads is 1/2. Because my friend 
is randomly choosing between two rooms, regardless of the coin toss result the probability of my 
room being chosen is always half. Therefore seeing my friend gives me no new information 
about the coin toss either. This means I should keep believing that the probability of heads to be 
1/2.  
Here the disagreement is apparent. Even though the two of us appear to have the same 
information about the coin toss we assign different probability to the same proposition. To make 
the matter more interesting nothing I could say would change her mind and vice versa. We can 
communicate however we like but nobody is going to revise their answer. This may seem strange 
but it is completely justified. The cause of this disagreement is our different interpretations of 
who is exactly in this meeting. Remember according to my friends’ reasoning the evidence that 
causes the probability update is “the chosen room is occupied.” The occupant, in case there are 
duplicates, could not be specified from her perspective. In other words, as long as there is 
 Assuming I take the position of this paper. 27
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someone in the room she will reason as such. This is expected since the cloning procedure is 
highly accurate so there is no objective feature relevant to the coin toss to differentiate each 
duplicate. However from my first-person perspective I can inherently specify the one whom she 
is in meeting with. It is me, myself. But this specification is only valid from first-perspective. 
Remember first-person identity is based on the immediacy to perception. Because perception is 
imperceivable by others this means my specification is incommunicable. I can keep telling her 
“this is me” and it would not mean anything to her. As a result the two of us would keep our own 
answers and remain in disagreement.  
The above paragraph explained why the disagreement is valid in the sense of subjective 
probability. This disagreement is also valid with a frequentist interpretation, which in my opinion 
is also easier to understand. The experiment can be repeated many times and the relative 
frequency can be used to show the correct probability. From my perspective repeating the 
experiment simply involves me going back to sleep, and wake up again after a coin toss and the 
potential cloning process. Of course after waking up I may not be the same physical human 
being just as the case of the first experiment. But this does not matter because in first-person 
perspective I am defined primitively base on subjective identity instead of objective features or 
qualities. So I would always regard the one falling asleep on the previous night as part of my 
subjective persistent self since it was the center of my perception and my current subjective 
experience is a continuation of it. To make the procedure easier suppose I can check the previous 
coin toss result before falling back to sleep again. So each iteration can be summarize as to go to 
sleep, wake up, and check the coin. Imagine repeating this iteration 1000 times by my count. I 
would have experienced about 500 heads and tails each. Furthermore if my friend is involved 
then I would see her about 500 times with about equal number of occurrences after heads or tails. 
However for these 1000 coin tosses my friend would see an occupied room about 750 times. The 
extra 250 times would be due to seeing the other duplicate instead of me after tails. It is easy to 
see our relative frequency of heads with a meeting are indeed different, half for me, a third for 
her. Of course my friend should be involved in far more repetitions than I do since every 
duplication of me are indifferent from her perspective so she shall be involved with their 
repetitions as well. However her relative frequency would remain unchanged by the higher 
number of iterations.  
One more thing to point out is that this disagreement is not because I am better at logical 
reasoning than my friend or the other way around. Neither is because anyone of us is in a 
epistemically more advantageous position. In fact I completely agree with her reasoning just as 
she agrees with mine. It is simply due to the difference in perspectives that caused my 
specification to be incommunicable and meaningless to her. In another word, we agree to 
disagree. 
5. Invalid Probabilities 
One topic of interest in anthropic reasonings is the probability distribution of oneself’s indexical 
positions. For the Sleeping Beauty Problem this includes questions such as “what is the 
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probability that this is the first awakening?” or “what is the probability that today is day 1?”. For 
the Doomsday argument this includes question of “what is the probability that I am among the 
first 100 billion human ever existed?”. Concepts such as a self-evident I, today and this present 
awakening are only specified in first-person perspective whereas the notions of all human 
beings, different days and awakenings belonging in the same reference class is only valid in 
third-person reasoning. Hence these questions are perspectively inconsistent thus invalid, 
meaning such probabilities do not exist. To my knowledge this idea has not been proposed by 
any published paper. This section intends to discuss this idea in detail.  
To remove other variables consider this uncomplicated experiment: you are taking part in a 
cloning experiment. At the end of the day, while sleeping, you would be cloned. The process is 
highly accurate such that it is humanly impossible to tell the resulting duplicates apart. All 
features among the two, including memories, would be indistinguishable. Note this cloning 
process is not contingent on any random event, it is guaranteed to happen. Also for the sake of 
differentiation the experimenters would randomly choose one of the two duplicates and put a 
piece of red paper in his room. A piece of blue paper would be put into the other room. Now 
suppose you wake up the following morning, it may seems natural to ask: “What is the 
probability that I am the original?”  
This uncomplicated experiment can be seen as a prototypical problem about probability of 
indexical positions. In this experiment the cloning process is a certainty. Thus the distinction of 
actually existing observers versus potentially existing observers is otiose. Supporters of Self-
Sampling Assumption and Self-Indication Assumption would give the same answer. It is also 
analogous to the Sleeping Beauty Problem when beauty is informed that the coin landed tails. 
When asked about which day it is Elga (2000) suggested that “even a highly restricted principle 
of indifference” would assign equal probability of today being day 1 or day 2. This has been 
accepted by halfers and thirders alike. Virtually all school of thoughts would give the answer as 
1/2 based on similar reasons. The generality of the problem is apparent. Therefore arguments 
regarding this experiment need not to target any halfers or thirders specifically.  
To show the question is perspectively inconsistent it is necessary to show that neither third- or 
first-person reasoning can meaningfully interpret the problem and provide an answer. Let’s 
consider third-person perspective first. An integral part of the question is pin pointing which 
exact duplicate’s indexical position is being asked. This is crucial since the truth value of a 
proposition about someone being the original depends on which particular duplicate it is 
referring to. This specification however proves to be an insurmountable challenge. As mentioned 
above taking a third-person perspective is to reason as an outside observer whose de se thoughts 
are unrelated to the topic of interest. From this perspective the duplicates are in equal positions. 
Consequently there is no inherently identifiable me among the the two. Therefore the question is 
incomprehensible. The next logical step would be to specify a duplicate by some objective 
features meaningful in third-person. For example I can check the color of my paper. Say I see 
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red. Then it can be asked “What is the probability that the red duplicate is the original? ”. While 28
this is a valid question, it is not equivalent to the original one . First of all, the indexical 29
question of “What is the probability that I am the original?” is defined the moment I become 
conscious . However the new question is only defined after seeing the color of my paper as red. 30
Secondly the experiment can be repeated such that each duplicate would undergo further fission. 
After waking up from another experiment the indexical question can be asked again without any 
modification. However due to the random selection process it is entirely possible for me to see a 
blue paper in a different iteration. Here the supposed equivalency between me and the red 
duplicate obviously breaks down. In order to save this equivalency it might be tempting to 
modify the new question as “what is the probability that the whatever-colour-I-see duplicate is 
the original?”. But then the problem of defining I in third-person returns. This shows the 
indexical question is incomprehensible from third-person perspective and there is no equivalent 
question to substitute it.  
A foreseeable counter against the above argument is that specifying a particular clone does not 
matter at all. After all regardless of which clone the clone is referring to, e.g. be it the red or the 
blue, the probability of him being the original is the same: 1/2. Therefore the answer to “the 
probability of me being the original” must also be 1/2. Discussion about how I am specified in 
third-person is nothing but pointless nitpicking. This argument is simply jumping the gun. 
Calculating the probability about a particular duplicate is part of a question’s solution. Whereas 
specifying one of the duplicates is part of the question itself. A question is logically prior to its 
solution. The fact that different duplicates give the same numerical answer cannot be used to 
nullify the importance of specification. I imagine even the validity supporters would consider 
“the probability of me being the original” and “the probability of my counterpart being the 
original” to be completely different questions. Even though by whose logic their value would be 
the same, i.e. 1/2. This again shows specification is a critical part of the indexical probability 
which cannot be overlooked just because it does not affect the numerical answer.  
We can also try to solve the problem from the first-person perspective. As previously discussed 
self is the center of first-person perspective. This mean I am uniquely different from anybody 
else which is identified by subjective immediacy to perception alone. This identity is primitive 
such that no other information is needed. Comparing to third-person reasoning first-person 
perspective have the unique advantage of knowing which is me inherently. So it does not have 
the problem of specification. However treating the two duplicates as equals and differentiating 
them basing on features such as the clone vs the original is third-person reasoning. Consequently 
first-person perspective could not interpret the two possibilities of the indexical question. This 
means first-person perspective could not comprehend the question either. There are arguments 
 Same as before here I am only focusing on the color for the easy of expression. Any details observed after waking 28
up can be used for specification.
 It is worth noting that the new question is not anthropic related. Also because the color is determined by a random 29
selection among all duplicates it would not lead to paradoxes similar to the Doomsday Argument. 
 That is, aside from the invalidity proposed here. 30
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successfully assigning a value to the probability. However they inevitably switched to third-
person reasoning at some point. A very commonly used argument is as follows: since half of all 
observers in question are original then the probability of me being the original must also be 1/2.  31
Sometimes this logic is presented in a more visual way: imagine all duplicates guesses he is the 
original then only half of them (one out of two) would be correct, suggesting the probability of 
me being the original must be half as well. Essentially this type of reasoning takes the average of 
all observers in question and treat that value as my indexical probability. While it is prima facie 
reasonable there is an underlying assumption involved. It assumes I am an ordinary member of 
all observers who belongs to the same reference class. This is in direct conflict with first-person 
reasoning where I am inherently unique. The notion that all duplicates are in the same reference 
class is only valid from third-person perspective.  Therefore the average-among-all arguments 32
are not perspectively consistent.  
Another foreseeable argument is that indexical possibilities are just not special at all. Before 
opening my eyes I can easily tell the probability of me seeing a piece of red paper is 1/2. 
Likewise the probability of me being the original should also be 1/2. This argument ignores the 
differences between seeing a piece of paper and being a certain individual. Which paper being 
most immediate to my perception is determined by a random experiment. Red and blue are just 
the two potential outcomes. These possibilities are comprehensible from the first-person 
perspective. Whereas the original and clone are third-person identities. There is no random 
experiment determining how I become one of the two. Of course one can imagine a experiment 
such that after the cloning procedure I get to be randomly incarnated into one of the bodies. With 
this experiment the indexical probability can be assigned just as the probability of seeing a 
certain colored paper. One obvious counter is that the experiment is entirely imaginary. However 
considering widely discussed Self-Sampling Assumption and Self-Indication Assumption are 
also based on imaginary processes this may not be seen as a serious shortfall by some. The 
definitive problem of this argument is its subtle switch to third-person perspective. Recall first-
person self is primitively defined by subjective immediacy to perception. However the imaginary 
incarnation procedure happens before I am awake and conscious. It prevents first-person self 
identification.  Meaning the I in the argument has to be defined by some feature instead. 33
Defining observers by features is third-person reasoning. Interestingly due to the nature of the 
imaginary experiment this feature can not be dependent on the physical body, meaning it must be 
something similar to the concept of a soul. Then which particular soul is the question referring to 
 Nick Bostrom(2003) used this idea and called it a Bland Indifference Principle. In which he also adds the 31
condition that there is have no evidence of me being more or less likely to be the original. But this condition already 
assumes the likelihood of me being the original as a valid notion so it is not presented here in this discussion. 
 In another word endorsing the idea that I am just an ordinary duplicate means I am not inherently special so it 32
wouldn’t be possible to directly specify myself in the indexical probability.
 Of course one can argue during the imagine experiment I am conscious just that all memory of it is lost once I get 33
embodied. But then from first-person perspective the person before incarnation is no longer perceptually immediate. 
So my subjective persistent self would not include any person-stage in the imaginary experiment. To have a unified 
identity during and after embodiment third-person definition has to be used. 
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would be critical. This brings back the specification problem mentioned earlier. Obviously the 
incarnation argument mixes two different perspectives as well. 
The above shows indexical probabilities necessarily mixes reasoning from both perspectives, 
therefore invalid. Even without considering perspective consistency there are other problems 
with such probabilities. The indifference principle accepted by halfers and thirders alike is high 
road to skepticism (Schwarz, 2011). For example, provided one knows there are many brains in 
vats that emulate his own subjective experience then he ought to be very confident that he is one 
of those brains (Elga, 2004). Bostrom (2003) suggests someone who is confident that human 
would eventually be able to run ancestor-simulations must also believe we are living in a 
simulation now . These arguments are very hard to take. Another problem is regarding the logic 34
of assigning indexical probabilities. Marcoci (2018) showed that Elga’s (2004) “highly restricted 
principle of indifference” would lead to the decision of not switching in the Monty Hall Problem. 
With these hard to explain problems and the paradoxes about anthropic reasoning it is safe to say 
the indexical probabilities’ invalidity is not as absurd as it may first seem. Questions regarding 
these probabilities are perspectively inconsistent fallacies with no answer. 
6. Discussions 
In summary, my position is that reasonings from different perspectives should not mix such that 
arguments should be perspectively consistent. From this starting point the answer to the sleeping 
beauty problem can be shown to be double halving. Once the importance of perspective 
consistency is recognized various controversies surrounding the problem can be, in my opinion, 
thoroughly explained.  
Comparing to other arguments supporting the double halving position perspective reasoning 
have several advantages. Earlier arguments all readily assign probabilities to perspectively 
inconsistent events such as “today being day 1”. This cause the probability of heads to decrease 
after learning it is day 1 under extant Bayesian updating rules. Various new updating rules about 
self-locating information have been suggested to keep the probability unchanged at 1/2. However 
none seems to be satisfactory. Halpern’s (2004) method, Meacham’s (2008) compartmentalized 
conditonalization and Briggs’ (2010) halfer rule all suggest beauty’s probability should be 1/2 if 
the experience from the two awakening are strictly identical. However if there are even tiny 
differences in objective details then the answer should change  (Titelbaum, 2013). e.g. in the case 
of Technicolor Beauty these methods suggest the probability should be 1/3 after seeing the 
 Bostrom (2003) also suggested a third possibility that future humans could be technologically able to run such 34
simulations but decides not to. Personally this alternative seems rather weak since the decision has to hold for every 
single individual over entire civilization history after such technology is available. Because even a few violators 
could run a great number of simulations and decisively alter the probability. 
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paper . Such positions are very questionable since the paper’s color is strictly independent of the 35
coin toss. Furthermore older argument suffers the same draw back as the Lewisian halfers does. 
They would predict a fair coin toss yet to happen will land on heads with a probability greater 
than 1/2 (Titelbaum, 2012). To show this the original coin toss is moved to day 1 after the first 
awakening . Another coin tosses is added on day 2 later than the potential second awakening. 36
The second coin toss is completely inconsequential, i.e. nothing depends on how the coin lands. 
Then it can be asked “what is the probability that today’s coin will land on heads?”. With 
perspective reasoning this question is trivial. The question is only meaningful from first-first-
person perspective since it uses the concept of today. It is obvious that the probability of heads is 
1/2 for this specific coin toss yet to happen. However the earlier arguments would reach a 
different solution. Earlier theories would treat the probability of “today’s coin landing on heads” 
as the sum of the probability that “today is day 1 and the first coin is landing on heads” and 
“today is day 2 and the second coin is landing on heads”. Halfer position dictates the probability 
of “today is day 1 and the first coin is landing heads” should be 1/2. Therefore as long as the 
probability of “today is day 2 and the second coin is landing on heads” is not 0, which is hard to 
argue otherwise , their answer must be greater than 1/2 (Titelbaum, 2012). More importantly 37
earlier double halving arguments do not provide a frequentist model nor any justification for the 
perspective disagreements discusses in previous sections. These should be enough to show that 
perspective consistency is the superior explanation for double halfer position. 
Readers familiar with the David Lewis’ (1979) centered and uncentered worlds may notice there 
are connections between these concepts and perspective reasonings. While trying to find a 
universal object for attitude David Lewis showed that uncentered propositions can be subsumed 
under centered propositions . Perhaps partially due to this conclusion uncentered probabilities is 38
often regarded as a type of centered probabilities. The discussion of sleeping beauty problem, 
and anthropic reasonings in general, can be seen as the debate of how to incorporate centered 
evidence while calculating the probability of an uncentered event. Obviously first-person 
perspective is centered reasoning. On the other hand, third-person perspective is to think from 
the viewpoint of someone whose de se thought is irrelevant which is analytically speaking 
 The counter argument demonstrated in section 3 would not apply here. Because it actually requires differentiating 35
first- and third-person perspectives to work. Since the process with pre-commitment is done by an outside observer 
while the process without pre-commitment is done by beauty herself. Without a clear distinction between the 
perspectives their difference becomes elusive. Furthermore without the justification for perspective disagreement it 
would be impossible to argue why beauty’s probability can be different from the outsider’s 1/3 since they could be in 
direct communication. 
 Elga (2000) suggested this change in the original paper and argued it would still be the same experiment. To my 36
knowledge no one has challenged it. 
 There are rare arguments that suggests when beauty wakes up she should be absolutely certain it is day 1 even 37
before being told so (Hawley, 2011). Traditionally they are regarded as quite implausible since it assign zero 
credence to a possibility (Titelbaum, 2013). However under perspective reasoning it is easy to see there are merits in 
those arguments since from beauty’s first-person perspective this awakening is definitively her first. 
 In his original paper (David Lewis, 1979) he used the term property for centered propositions and reserved the 38
term proposition to indicate uncentered propositions only. 
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uncentered reasoning . Therefore the perspective consistency argument proposed in this paper 39
can also be seen as the argument against mixing centered and uncentered reasonings. 
Coincidentally the argument is not new if presented this way. Peter Lewis (2010) and Luna 
(2018) both claimed it is impossible to merge centered and uncentered probabilities and any 
attempt in mixing worlds of different kinds in the same logical framework would lead one astray. 
However they both concluded the centered and uncentered probabilities are different, i.e. the 
probability of “the coin landed on heads” is 1/2 but the probability of “this is a heads awakening” 
is 1/3. This is very hard to swallow because they have the same truth value, i.e. one proposition 
is true if and only if the other is true. Interestingly enough the root cause of this supposed 
probability discrepancy is precisely the mix of centered and uncentered reasoning. Luna (2018) 
used a frequentist approach to calculate the centered probability. As discussed in section 3, 
according to first-person perceptive centered reasoning the repetitions shall take a nested 
structure. Only awakenings beauty personally experienced  are relevant. As a result the relative 40
frequency as the number of repetitions approaches infinity shall be 1/2. However Luna 
performed an uncentered calculation of relative frequency of awakenings. Here the repetition 
structure is irrelevant and all awakenings from different duplicates are used in the calculation. 
Consequently the probability was mistakenly deemed as 1/3. Peter Lewis (2010) used Dutch 
Book arguments to show the centered probability to be 1/3. In these arguments bets from 
different awakening are pooled together and settled in one account, which is valid only for 
outsider observers. For beauty’s first-person centered reasoning the other duplicate, or beauty 
from another day, is primitively not herself. Therefore each one shall have a duplicated account 
that settles independently such that bets from two awakenings are never pooled together. This 
way it is easy to see beauty would avoid getting Dutch booked only if she keep her credence 
unchanged at 1/2 after waking up. These demonstrates properly separating centered and 
uncentered reasoning would not result in the counterintuitive conclusion of probability 
discrepancy. The correct probability should be 1/2 for both cases. Once again perspective 
consistency is the key in resolving the paradox.  
In conclusion perspective reasoning is crucial in anthropic related problems. With it in mind the 
correct answer to the Sleeping Beauty Problem can be shown to be double halving. It also 
disproves the Doomsday Argument and the Presumptuous Philosopher problem. In my opinion 
perspective reasoning definitely deserves more attention as it could be the key to other 
paradoxical arguments.  
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